





















































the	 initial	 sell-off	 announcement.	 Employing	 the	 classical	 event	 study	 methodology,	
significant	positive	price	movements	are	observed	for	the	parent	firms	on,	and	around	
the	announcement	date.	The	results	are	consistent	with	previous	studies	indicating	that	
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The	 wealth	 effects	 of	 corporate	 sell-offs	 on	 shareholder	 wealth	 have	 been	 studied	
thoroughly.	 These	 studies	 usually	 denote	 a	 significant	 increase	 in	 shareholder	wealth	
resulting	 from	 sell-off	 announcements	 for	 the	 seller	 (e.g.	 Rosenfeld,	 1984;	 Jain,	 1985	
and	Hite,	Owers	and	Rogers,	1987),	as	well	for	the	buyer	(Hite	et	al.	1987).	Beside	short-
run	 performance,	 the	 argument	 that	 the	 initial	 market	 reaction	 to	 sell-off	
announcements	 may	 not	 disclose	 the	 complete	 impact	 of	 sell-offs,	 led	 to	 the	
investigation	of	 long-run	wealth	 effects	 subsequent	 to	 the	 announcement	 (e.g.	 Bates,	
2005).	
Although	 sell-off	 announcements	 have	 been	 associated	 with	 positive	 wealth	
gains	 for	 shareholders	 of	 the	 selling	 firm	 on	 the	 announcement	 day(s),	 an	 important	
issue	 to	 examine	 is	why	 firms	 choose	 to	 voluntary	 sell	 part	 of	 their	 assets	 in	 the	 first	
place.	 Prior	 studies	 have	 related	 the	 difference	 in	 announcement	 day	 effects	 among	
firms	engaged	in	sell-offs	with	the	intended	use	of	proceeds	(e.g.	John	and	Ofek,	1995)	
and,	moreover,	 further	 investigation	has	shown	that	several	 factors	beside	the	motive	
also	contribute	to	the	magnitude	of	wealth	gains	(e.g.	Klein,	1986).	
In	 contrast	 to	 short-run	 shareholder	wealth,	 the	 long-run	 performance	 of	 sell-
offs	has	been	far	less	examined.	Evidence	on	shareholder	wealth	following	sell-offs	has	
shown	 that	 the	 increase	 in	 shareholder	 wealth	 is	 associated	 with	 the	 use	 of	 the	
proceeds	 from	 the	 asset	 sale	 (Bates,	 2005).	 The	 empirical	 findings	 of	 an	 UK	 study	
indicate	that	sell-offs	are	negatively	related	to	shareholder	wealth	in	the	UK	irrespective	
of	 the	 allocation	 of	 the	 subsequent	 gains	 (Lee	 and	 Lin,	 2008).	However,	 a	 later	 study	
showed	 that	 shareholders	 benefit	 only	 if	 these	 proceeds	 are	 allocated	 efficiently	
(Francoeur	and	Niyubahwe,	2009).	





that	 comprise	 the	 two	 samples	 are	 evaluated	 in	 order	 to	determine	whether	 sell-offs	
generate	wealth	 gains	 for	 the	 shareholders	of	 the	 selling	 firms,	both	 in	 the	 short	 and	






positive	 abnormal	 returns	 around	 the	 announcement	 day,	 with	 abnormal	 returns	 of	
2.04%	 for	 the	 full	 sample	 and	 2.75%	 for	 the	 sub-sample	 These	 results	 are	 consistent	
with	previous	studies	and	indicate	that	sell-off	announcements	are	positively	related	to	





after	 the	 announcement.	 Nevertheless,	 buy-and-hold	 abnormal	 returns	 climb	 from	 -
3.12%	 to	 -1.28%	 for	 the	 full-sample	 and	 from	 -3.34%	 to	 -1.50%	 for	 the	 sub-sample	
between	 6	 and	 12	 months	 after	 the	 announcement,	 suggesting,	 in	 accordance	 to	
Francoeur	and	Niyubahwe,	2009,	that	sell-offs	create	shareholder	value	but	only	when	
the	proceeds	from	the	sell-off	are	allocated	efficiently.	Finally,	the	analysis	of	the	firms’	
operating	 performance	 yields	 mostly	 insignificant	 mean	 and	 median	 changes.	
Nevertheless,	the	results	 imply	that	sell-offs	have	a	positive	 impact	on	the	firms’	post-
performance	 contributing	 in	 the	 improvement	 of	 their	 profitability,	 liquidity	 and	
leverage	levels	and	retaining	their	efficiency	at	the	pre	sell-off	levels.	
The	next	 Section	provides	 a	 review	of	 the	 literature	on	 corporate	 sell-offs	 and	
the	remainder	of	this	study	is	structured	as	follows.	Section	3	covers	the	hypotheses	for	
the	study;	Section	4	describes	the	sample;	Section	5	explains	the	methodology;	Section	





This	 section	 first	 defines	 sell-offs	 (Section	 2.1)	 and	 afterwards	 it	 enlarges	 upon	 the	
existing	 literature.	 Section	 2.2	 presents	 the	motives	 for	 sell-offs;	 Section	 2.3	 provides	





A	sell-off	 is	a	 type	of	divesture	where	certain	assets	of	a	 firm	are	disposed	to	another	
firm.	 Assets	 being	 divested	 include	 the	 sale	 of	 subsidiaries,	 divisions	 or	 other	
combinations	of	fixed	assets	in	exchange	for	some	form	of	consideration	(cash,	assets	or	
securities	of	the	acquiring	firm).	A	sell-off	transaction	involves	three	parties,	the	selling	
firm	 (vendor),	 the	 asset	 being	 sold	 (target)	 and	 the	 acquirer,	 while	 the	 vendor	
relinquishes	both	the	ownership	and	the	control	of	the	asset.		
Other	 forms	 of	 divestitures	 are	 spin-offs	 and	 equity	 carve	 outs.	 In	 contrast	 to	
sell-offs,	in	spin-offs	the	divested	assets	become	a	newly	organized	firm	through	the	sale	
or	 distribution	 of	 new	 shares	 to	 the	 existing	 shareholders	 and	 equity	 carve-outs	 are	
initial	public	offerings	of	a	full	or	partial	interest	in	a	subsidiary.	Although	prior	research	












units	 of	 their	 business.	 These	 motives	 can	 be	 classified	 into	 two	 broader	 categories:	
firms	 that	 divest	 for	 financial	 reasons	 and	 firms	 that	 divest	 for	 strategic	 reasons.	 The	
following	paragraphs	provide	an	analysis	of	the	reasons	behind	sell-offs.	
One	motivation	for	sell-offs	offered	in	the	existing	literature	by	Hite	et	al.,	1987	
is	 the	 efficient	 deployment	 hypothesis.	 According	 to	 this	 theory,	 asset	 sales	 promote	
efficiency	 if	 they	are	more	valuable	to	another	organization.	Within	this	context,	 firms	
only	 maintain	 assets	 for	 which	 they	 have	 comparative	 advantage	 and	 dispose	 assets	
when	they	are	believed	to	be	more	valuable	to	other	firms.	However,	for	this	hypothesis	









affordable.	 The	 main	 empirical	 results	 of	 their	 study	 are	 in	 support	 of	 this	 theory.	
Specifically,	their	study	found	that	the	wealth	gains	for	firms	are	greater	when	the	cash	
proceeds	from	sell-offs	are	allocated	for	debt	repayment	and	less	for	firms	that	intend	





A	third	motive	 for	sell-offs	 is	 the	sale	of	assets	 that	underperform.	Ravenscraft	





a	 sample	 of	 firms	 that	 announce	 to	 divest	 well-performing	 divisions	 and	 a	 second	
sample	of	firms	announcing	the	sale	of	poorly	performing	divisions.	Their	results	show	
that	the	sale	of	underperforming	units	conveys	no	news	about	the	division,	while	on	the	
contrary	 the	 sale	 of	 healthy	 business	 units	 is	 value-enhancing.	 The	 lack	 of	 the	
profitability	of	an	asset,	according	to	Linn	and	Rozeff,	1984,	should	not	be	resolved	by	
divesting	the	asset,	but	other	methods	should	be	examined	to	solve	the	problem.	
A	 forth	motive	 for	 sell-offs	 that	has	been	 studied	over	 the	past	decades	 is	 the	
increase	in	focus	of	firms	on	their	core	business.	Linn	and	Rozeff,	1984	stated	that	the	
disposal	of	assets	 that	are	unrelated	 to	 the	core	operations	of	 the	seller	 is	one	of	 the	
most	common	motives	for	sell-offs.	John	and	Ofek,	1995,	in	a	study	of	321	divestitures,	





Another	 motive	 for	 sell-offs	 is	 to	 raise	 capital	 in	 order	 to	 finance	 future	
investments.	 This	motive	 differs	 from	 the	 financing	 theory	where	 no	 long-term	 plans	







which	divestments	 the	market	 views	 as	 value-enhancing	 and	what	 type	of	 divestiture	
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destroys	shareholder	value.	Their	example	showed	that	a	firm	undertaking	divestment	
in	 order	 to	 avoid	 antitakeover	 attacks	 not	 only	 does	 not	 create	 value	 but	 also	 rather	
destroys	 it.	 Loh,	Bezjak	and	Toms,	1995	examined	 the	differences	between	 firms	 that	
are	 subject	 to	 takeover	 speculations	before	 the	 sell-off	 announcement	 and	 firms	 that	
are	not.	 Their	 findings	 indicate	 that	 sell-off	 announcements	of	 firms	with	no	 takeover	
speculations	 are	 related	 to	 significant	 wealth	 gains	 compared	 to	 firms	 with	 takeover	
rumors	 before	 the	 announcement.	 Finally,	 MacKinnon,	 2002	 studied	 the	 effect	 of	
takeover	 threats	 of	 voluntary	 sell-offs	 on	 the	 divestitures’	 announcement.	His	 sample	















value	 to	 total	 assets	 of	 the	 seller.	 In	 addition,	 the	 financial	 status	 of	 the	 firms	 was	
measured	using	 the	Standard	&	Poors	bond	ratings,	 ranking	 firms	with	A+,	A,	or	A-	as	
“good”	and	below	A-	as	“poor”.	
Klein,	 1986	examined	 the	 form	and	 content	of	 sell-announcements.	 She	 found	
evidence	 consistent	 with	 prior	 studies	 that	 relate	 the	 size	 of	 the	 sell-off	 to	 positive	
market	 movements.	 Moreover,	 she	 divided	 a	 sample	 of	 voluntary	 sell-off	
announcements	 into	 two	 subsamples	 based	 on	whether	 the	 announcement	 discloses	
the	 transaction	 price.	 Her	 findings	 support	 that	 the	 disclosure	 of	 the	 sales	 price	
constitute	a	factor	that	affects	the	wealth	gains	of	sell-off	announcements.	The	measure	
of	 the	 relative	 size	 of	 the	 divesting	 asset	 used	 by	 Klein,	 1986	 is	 the	 announced	
transaction	price	divided	by	the	market	value	of	the	selling	firm’s	common	shares,	based	
on	the	last	trading	day	of	the	month	before	the	sell-off	announcement.	Similarly,	Afshar,	





and	 wealth	 effects	 of	 a	 sample	 comprised	 of	 146	 firms.	 The	 outcome	 of	 their	 study	
showed	 that	 firms,	 which	 compensate	 their	 executives	 with	 long-term	 performance	
plans,	are	rewarded	with	higher	gains	than	firms	with	no	future	investment	plans.	
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Hirschey	and	Zaima,	1989	 studied	 the	 impact	of	 insider	 trading	and	ownership	





Hirschey,	 Slovin	 and	 Zaima,	 1990	 tested	 the	 relation	 of	 banks’	 monitoring	
functions	with	market	movements	of	sell-off	announcements.	They	presented	evidence	
that	 firms	 with	 higher	 bank	 loan	 are	 accompanied	 with	 higher	 returns	 compared	 to	
those	 with	 little	 or	 no	 bank	 debt.	 In	 their	 opinion,	 the	market	 has	 a	more	 favorable	
reaction	to	firms	with	bank	loans	in	contrast	to	other	types	of	debt.		
Sicherman	 and	 Pettway,	 1992	 examined	 a	 sample	 of	 278	 sell-offs	 and	 their	
findings	 agree	with	 the	 study	of	Klein,	 1986	 that	 selling	 firms	experience	higher	 gains	
when	the	transaction	price	 is	disclosed.	Furthermore,	 their	study	suggests	that	sellers,	
which	 had	 credit	 downgrades	 during	 the	 two	 years	 prior	 the	 announcement,	 receive	




a	 sample	 of	 diversified	 firms.	 His	 results	 indicate	 that	 the	 probability	 of	 a	 sell-off	 is	




Lastly,	 non-US	 studies	 contribute	 to	 the	 literature	 providing	 evidence	 of	
additional	value	creating	drivers.	Alexandrou	and	Sudarsanam’s,	2001	study	of	a	 large	
sample	of	UK	firms	found	that	selling	firms	benefit	more	in	time	of	recession	rather	than	
in	 booming	 economic	 conditions.	 Further,	 they	 found	 that	 value	 gains	 are	 greater	 for	
firms	when	the	acquiring	firm	is	based	in	a	different	country	than	the	target’s	one.	One	
year	 later,	 Clubb	 and	 Stouraitis,	 2002,	 which	 also	 used	 a	 sample	 of	 UK	 firms	 in	 their	









Empirical	 results	 of	 existing	 studies	 on	 voluntary	 sell	 of	 announcements	 indicate	 that	
sell-off	 announcements	 are	 associated	with	 positive	 stock	market	movements	 around	
the	 initial	 announcement	 day(s)	 for	 the	 selling	 firm.	 Moreover,	 several	 studies	 have	
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related	 the	positive	adoption	of	a	 sell-off	announcement	by	 the	market	 to	 the	 factors	
analyzed	above.		
Rosenfeld,	 1984,	 Jain,	 1985	and	Hite	et	 al.,	 1987	document	 significant	positive	
abnormal	 returns	 on	 the	 announcement	 day(s),	 whereas	 Alexander,	 Benson	 &	
Kampmeyer,	 1984	 found	 positive	 but	 insignificant	 abnormal	 returns	 during	 the	
announcement	 period.	 In	 addition,	 Hite	 et	 al.,	 1987	 states	 that	 abnormal	 returns	 are	
higher	 for	 successful	 sellers	 than	 for	 unsuccessful	 sellers,	while	 both	Alexander	 et	 al.,	
1984	 and	 Jain,	 1985	 report	 that	 sell-offs	most	 frequently	 follow	 a	 period	 of	 negative	
abnormal	 returns.	 In	 another	 study,	 Hearth	 and	 Zaima,	 1984	 found	 larger	 abnormal	
returns	for	firms	that	sell	a	 large	portion	of	their	assets.	Klein,	1986	reports	significant	
positive	price	movements	 in	announced	 transaction	price	 sell	offs,	while	Hirschey	and	
Zaima,	 1989	 found	 positive	 returns	 at	 the	 sell-off	 announcement	 for	 firms	 disclosing	
negotiations.	 Finally,	 Sichermann	 and	 Pettway,	 1992	 document	 greater	 two-day	
announcement	 cumulative	 abnormal	 returns	 for	 the	 selling	 firms	 that	 had	 no	 credit	
downgrades	 two	 years	 prior	 the	 announcement.	 An	 overview	 of	 these	 studies	 is	













Kampmeyer	(1984)	 53	 1964-1973	 MAR	 (-1,0)	 0.17%	
Rosenfeld	(1984)	 62	 1963-1981	 MAR	 (-1,0)	 2.33%	
Jain	(1985)	 1064	 1976-1978	 MAR	 (-1,0)	 0.53%	
Hearth	&	Zaima	(1986)	 75	 1979-1982	 MAR	 (-1,0)	 1.42%	
Klein	(1986)	 202	 1970-1979	 MM	 (-1,0)	 0.72%	
Hite,	Owers	&	Rogers	(1987)	 55	 1963-1978	 MM	 (-1,0)	 1.66%	
Hirschey	&	Zaima	(1989)	 64	 1975-1982	 MM	 (-1,0)	 1.64%	










announcement	 returns.	 His	 study	 of	 a	 US	 sample	 of	 400	 asset	 sales	 reveal	 positive	
abnormal	 returns	up	 to	 two	years	 following	 the	sale	announcement	among	 firms	 that	




costs	 of	 managerial	 discretion.	 The	 method	 applied	 in	 Bates’,	 2005	 study	 is	 the	
macroeconomic-based	factor	model	(Eckbo,	Masoulis	and	Norli,	2000).	
In	 another	 study,	 Lee	 and	 Lin,	 2008	 also	 examined	 the	 long-run	 return	
performance	 following	 sell-off	 announcements	of	 a	 sample	of	UK	 firms	 that	 intend	 to	
use	the	proceeds	from	the	sale	either	for	investment	or	debt	reduction.	They	measured	





are	 systematically	 connected	 to	 lower	 returns	 given	 their	 exposure	 to	 the	 risk	 factors	
specified	 in	 the	 Fama	 and	 French,	 1996	 model.	 Furthermore,	 they	 suggest	 that	 the	
difference	 between	 their	 results	 and	 those	 of	 Bates,	 2005	may	 be	 due	 to	 the	 unlike	
incentives	 and	 characteristics	 of	 UK	 and	US	 firms	 and/or	 the	 different	model	 used	 in	
their	studies.	





to	 three	 years	 after	 the	 sell-off,	 as	 well	 as	 whether	 there	 is	 a	 connection	 between	
abnormal	 returns	 and	 the	 investment	 behavior	 of	 firms.	 	 Their	 results	 indicate	 no	
significant	abnormal	returns	(positive	or	negative)	in	the	post	divestiture	period	for	the	
whole	 sample,	nor	 for	 the	 sub-samples	of	 firms	 that	 improve	or	do	not	 improve	 their	





















returns	 for	 shareholders	 around	 the	 initial	 announcement	 day(s).	 Since	 this	 paper	
studies	 also	 whether	 sell-off	 announcements	 create	 shareholder	 value	 at	 their	
announcement,	a	testable	hypothesis	needs	to	be	defined.	Furthermore,	stock	market	
effects	will	be	tested	for	several	small	time	intervals	surrounding	the	announcement	day	
in	 order	 to	 examine	 the	 cumulative	 abnormal	 returns	 before,	 around	 and	 after	 the	
announcement.	The	respective	hypothesis	is:	





The	second	 topic	under	analysis	of	 this	 study	 is	whether	 sell-off	announcements	have	
long-run	wealth	impact	for	shareholders.	Therefore,	stock	market	effects	will	be	tested	







The	 last	 issue	 examined	 in	 this	 study	 is	 whether	 sell-offs	 improve	 the	 long-term	
operating	performance	of	the	seller.	A	specific	number	of	characteristics	of	the	firms	will	














This	 study	 is	 based	 on	 voluntary	 corporate	 sell-offs	 of	 US	 high	 technology	 firms	 that	
announced	 the	 divestiture	 between	 January	 1,	 2010	 and	 December	 31,	 2015.	 The	
industry-specific	criteria	of	the	firms	was	selected	in	order	to	provide	consistency	of	the	
firms	within	the	sample,	whereas	the	period	under	analysis	was	partly	chosen	because	
firms	must	be	 listed	 for	3	years	after	 the	 sell-off	 so	 that	data	 for	 the	 long-term	study	
would	be	available.	As	mentioned	before,	to	be	included	in	the	sample,	the	parent	firm	
must	 be	 classified	 as	 high	 technology	 firm	according	 to	 the	 Thomson	 Financial	Macro	





a	 market	 reaction.	 This	 cut-off	 value	 is	 consistent	 with	 previous	 studies	 (e.g.	 Jain	
(1985)).	 The	 initial	 sample	 obtained	 from	 the	 Thomson	 Financial	 Mergers	 and	
Acquisitions’	 database	 consisted	 of	 213	 completed	 voluntary	 divestitures	 between	
January	 1,	 2010	 and	 December	 31,	 2015	 by	 US	 publicly	 listed	 high	 technology	 firms,	
whose	deal	value	exceeded	$10	mil	and	where	the	control	was	shifted	to	the	acquirer.	
From	 this	data	 source,	 the	 initial	 sample	was	 further	 limited	by	deleting	17	 leveraged	
buyout,	 12	 spin-off	 and	 1	 sale	 and	 leaseback	 transactions,	 as	 well	 as	 5	 transactions	
associated	with	bankruptcy	or	 liquidation	of	 the	parent	 firm	and	2	divestitures	where	
neither	 of	 the	 parents	 had	 complete	 control	 over	 the	 divested	 asset	 (joint	 ventures).	
These	 restrictions	 are	 in	 line	with	 the	definitions	 given	 in	 Section	 2.1	 and	 the	 sample	




Thomson	Reuters	 Eikon.	 This	 platform	 includes	 data	 on	 financial	markets,	 companies’	
financial	 data,	 etc.	Only	 firms	 that	 had	 their	 stock	 continuously	 listed	on	 the	NYSE	or	
NASDAQ	 for	 3	 years	 before	 and	 after	 the	 sell-off	 announcement	 and	 those	 with	





announcement	 surrounding	 the	 initial	 sell-off,	 together	 with	 the	 final	 sample,	 a	 sub-
sample	was	constructed	to	prevent	the	performance	related	to	those	other	events	from	
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causing	 misleading	 results.	 This	 sub-sample	 was	 derived	 from	 the	 final	 sample	 by	
selecting	only	sell-off	announcements	with	no	contaminated	announcement	within	the	
period	 of	 20	 days	 centered	 on	 the	 initial	 announcement	 date.	 A	 contaminating	
announcement	is	defined	as	another	company	deals’	announcement	(e.g.	another	sell-
off,	 an	acquisition	or	 a	 spin-off	 announcement,	 share	buyback	announcements).	After	
subtracting	sell-offs	with	contaminated	announcements	 in	 the	 (-10.	+10)	 interval	 from	















where	 the	evidence	 shows	 that	 the	deal	with	 the	 first	 and	 second	highest	 value	 took	
place	in	2014	and	2015.	The	largest	deal	was	the	sale	of	Motorola	Mobility	Holdings	of	
Google	for	$3,088.795	mil	in	January	2014.	


























2010	 13	 12,38%	 3.221,821	 247,832	 1.280,000	 27,800	
2011	 17	 16,19%	 1.944,400	 114,376	 480,000	 10,000	
2012	 24	 22,86%	 6.677,253	 278,219	 2.377,232	 11,500	
2013	 18	 17,14%	 2.698,205	 149,900	 725,000	 10,847	
2014	 15	 14,29%	 6.735,567	 449,038	 3.088,795	 10,000	
2015	 18	 17,14%	 7.212,463	 400,692	 3.041,840	 14,000	
Total	 105	 100%	 28.489,709	 271,331	 10.992,867	 84,147	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	Panel	B	














2010	 8	 10,96%	 2.135,800	 266,975	 1.280,000	 27,800	
2011	 11	 15,07%	 859,400	 78,127	 185,000	 10,000	
2012	 16	 21,92%	 1.678,079	 104,880	 800,000	 11,500	
2013	 13	 17,81%	 1.145,672	 88,129	 203,625	 10,847	
2014	 12	 16,44%	 1.574,894	 131,241	 650,000	 10,000	
2015	 13	 17,81%	 2.756,923	 212,071	 1.799,968	 14,000	
Total	 73	 100%	 10.150,768	 139,052	 4.918,593	 84,147	
	
	
Table	 3	 shows	 descriptive	 statistics	 of	 the	 overall	 sample	 for	 sellers’	 mid	 industry	
classification	 and	 the	 distribution	 of	 sell-offs	 by	 parent	 firms	 according	 to	 their	 mid	
industry.	The	total	number	of	selling	firms	involved	in	sell-offs	is	74.	
As	 previously	 noted,	 the	 sample	 contains	 only	 firms	 listed	 as	 High	 Technology	
according	 to	 Thomson	 Financial	 Mergers	 and	 Acquisitions’	 database.	 Splitting	 the	
industry	 from	 macro	 to	 mid	 industry	 further	 specifies	 this	 classification.	 Thomson	
Financial	Macro	Industry	is	divided	into	10	sub-industries,	which	are	reported	in	the	first	
column	of	the	table.	
The	 greatest	 proportion	 of	 sell-offs	 arises	 in	 relation	 to	 firms	 classified	 in	 the	




derive	 from	 the	 Internet	 Software	 &	 Services	 and	 IT	 Consulting	 &	 Services’	 industry,	
corresponding	 to	 11	 and	 16	 sell-offs	 respectively.	 For	 the	 next	 three	 mid	 industries	
(Software,	E-commerce/B2B	and	Other	High	Technology)	the	number	of	firms	is	equal	in	
value	 to	 7,	 4	 and	 1,	with	 10,	 5	 and	 3	 respective	 sell-offs.	 Finally,	 none	 of	 the	 overall	




Thomson	Financial	Mid	Industry		 No.	of	firms	 %	of	firms	 No.	of	sell-offs	 %	of	sell-offs	
Computers	&	Peripherals	 16	 21.62%	 23	 21.90%	
E-commerce	/	B2B	 4	 5.41%	 5	 4.76%	
Electronics	 9	 12.16%	 9	 8.57%	
Hardware	 0	 0%	 0	 0%	
Internet	Infrastructure	 0	 0%	 0	 0%	
Internet	Software	&	Services	 8	 10.81%	 11	 10.48%	
IT	Consulting	&	Services	 8	 10.81%	 16	 15.24%	
Other	High	Technology	 1	 1.35%	 3	 2.86%	
Semiconductors	 21	 28.38%	 28	 26.67%	
Software	 7	 9.46%	 10	 9.52%	















To	 examine	 the	 short-term	 return	 performance	 surrounding	 sell-off	 announcements,	
the	 market	 reaction	 of	 these	 announcements	 is	 tested	 using	 the	 event	 study	
methodology	 (Brown	 and	Warner,	 1985).	 For	 this	 purpose,	 daily	 historical	 stock	 price	
data	had	been	collected	from	250	days	before	to	10	days	after	each	announcement	for	
every	 single	 sell-off	 and	 the	 event	 date	 (day	 zero)	 is	 defined	 as	 the	 announcement	
business	 day	 (for	 announcements	 on	 a	 non-trading	 day	 the	 event	 date	 is	 the	 next	
available	business	day).	Concurrently,	as	the	S&P	500	Index	is	used	as	the	proxy	for	the	
market	portfolio,	 for	 every	 sell-off	 the	 respective	data	of	 the	 S&P	500	 Index	was	also	
retrieved.	 The	 selling	 firms’	 abnormal	 daily	 returns	 (ARs)	 for	 each	 announcement	 are	






















The	 null	 hypothesis	 of	 Section	 3.1	 is	 tested	 in	 order	 to	 examine	 whether	 sell-off	
announcements	produce	abnormal	returns	for	the	firm	in	the	short	horizon,	which	is	the	
interval	(-10,+10)	around	the	announcement	day.	The	null	hypothesis	is	tested	using	the	𝑡-test	and	the	respective	formula	to	calculate	the	test	statistic	is:	
	 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 =  𝐴𝑅!𝜎(𝐴𝑅!")	
	


















	 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 =  𝐴𝑅!𝜎(𝐴𝑅!)	
	
where		𝐴𝑅!		 is	 the	 average	 abnormal	 return	 for	 the	 sample	 on	 day	𝑡	(abnormal	
returns	were	trimmed	by	2%	to	exclude	outliers).	




For	 both	 models,	 cumulative	 abnormal	 returns	 (CARs)	 are	 calculated	 for	 the	 event	
window,	as	well	as	for	several,	different	in	length,	windows	surrounding	the	event	date.	
Different	 in	 length	windows	are	used	to	provide	consistency	with	the	respective	event	









Similar	 to	 abnormal	 returns,	 cumulative	 abnormal	 returns	 are	 tested	 to	 determine	
whether	 they	 are	 significantly	 different	 from	 zero	 or	 not,	 hence,	 if	 sell-off	
announcements	 produce	 cumulative	 abnormal	 returns	 over	 a	 certain	 time	 period.	
Again,	the	𝑡-test	is	used	for	this	purpose	and	the	respective	test	statistic	is	given	by:	
	 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 =  𝐶𝐴𝑅!𝑇𝜎(𝐴𝑅!")	
	
if	abnormal	returns	had	been	calculated	by	the	market	model	and	






The	 buy-and	 hold	 abnormal	 returns	 (BHARs)	method	 is	 implemented	 to	 test	whether	
sell-offs	create	shareholder	value	on	the	long	run.	Once	again	daily	historical	stock	price	
data	 for	 each	 announcement	 and	 the	 respective	 data	 of	 the	 S&P500	 Index	 were	
collected	for	6,	12,	18	and	24	months	(125,	250,	375	and	500	days)	subsequent	to	the	
event	date.	The	buy-and-hold	abnormal	returns	for	firm	𝑖	in	period	T	is:	





Next,	 t-statistics	 for	 the	different	normal	 return	estimation	procedures	are	calculated.	
As	a	result	of	the	employment	of	market	returns,	the	distribution	of	long-run	abnormal	





𝑡!"#$%#!!!!"#$%&'" =  𝑁 𝑆 +  13 𝛾𝑆! +  16𝑁 𝛾 	
	
where	N	is	the	sample	size	after	trimming	BHARs	by	2%	to	exclude	outliers.	
	 S= !"#!$![! (!"#$!)],		 where	𝐴𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅! 	is	 the	 sample	 mean	 of	 BHARs	 for	 the	
sample	N	and	𝜎 (𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅!)	 is	 the	 sample	cross-sectional	
standard	deviation	of	BHARs	for	the	sample	N.	






















Wicoxon	 signed	 rank	 test.	 These	 tests	 are	 used	 to	 examine	 the	 mean	 and	 median	
















produce	 significant	 and	 almost	 identical	 abnormal	 returns	 of	 2.04	 and	 2.09%,	
respectively,	on	the	announcement	day.	Both	of	them	are	statistically	significant	at	the	
1%	 level,	 with	 a	 higher	 t-statistic	 for	 the	market	model	 (11.13)	 than	 for	 the	market-
adjusted	model	 (4.06).	 The	difference	 in	 the	value	of	 the	 t-statistics	 arises	due	 to	 the	
diversification	of	the	two	models.	In	addition,	the	statistically	significant	positive	ARs	for	







full	 sample,	 are	 attributable	 to	 the	 smaller	 sample	 size	 used	 by	 the	 sub-sample.	















































	0	 2.04%	 11.13	 ***	
	
2.09%	 4.06	 ***	
1	 0.31%	 1.67	 *	
	
0.21%	 0.54	











































































































abnormal	 returns	 (CARs)	with	 both	 the	market	 and	 the	market-adjusted	model.	 CARs	
are	 given	 for	 several	 event	 windows,	 which	 are	 depicted	 in	 the	 first	 column,	 for	 the	
sample	 with	 contaminated	 announcements	 (Panel	 A)	 and	 for	 the	 sample	 without	
contaminated	announcements	(Panel	B).	
Although	 both	 models	 illustrate	 similar	 CARs,	 the	 results	 are	 statistically	
significant	 mainly	 for	 the	 market	 model	 approach.	 CARs	 are	 statistically	 significant	
positive	wealth	 gains	 for	 divesting	 firms	 of	 both	 samples	 for	 the	 event	windows	 (+1,	
+10),	(+1,	+5),	(-1,	+1)	and	(-1,	0).	In	the	pre	event	period	negative	CARs	are	observed	in	
the	(-10,	-1)	window	and	insignificant	positive	CARs	in	the	(-5,	-1)	window.	The	highest	
CARs	are	2.39%	for	 the	 full	 sample	and	3.30%	for	 the	sub-sample,	both	 in	 the	 (-1,	+1)	
event	 window.	 CARs	 in	 the	 -1	 to	 0	 event	 window	 have	 the	 greatest	 t-statistic	 with	
	 27	
respective	abnormal	return	and	t-statistic	values	of	2.08%	(8.04)	for	the	full	sample	and	
2.95%	 (7.06)	 for	 the	 sub-sample.	 The	 CARs	 of	 2.08%	 in	 the	 (-1,	 0)	 event	window	 are	
comparable	to	the	studies	of	Klein,	1986,	Hite	et	al.,	1987,	Hirschey	and	Zaima,	1989	and	
Sicherman	 and	 Pettway,	 1992,	 who	 also	 used	 the	 market	 model	 approach	 in	 their	


































	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Panel	B	





































Lee	and	Lin,	2008,	which	also	 find	negative	but	 statistically	 significant	BHARs	 for	 their	
sample	of	UK	 sell-offs.	 For	 the	12	months	 following	 the	deal,	 BHARs	 seem	 to	 recover	




positively	 to	 the	 firms.	 As	 Francoeur	 and	 Niyubahwe,	 2008	 report,	 BHARs	 are	
significantly	 and	 positively	 related	 to	 the	 allocation	 efficiency	 of	 the	 firms’	 internal	
capital	 market.	 Lastly,	 the	 value	 of	 the	 adjusted	 t-statistic	 18	 months	 after	 the	






	 	 	 			 6	months	 12	months	 18	months	 24	months	
BHARs	 -3.12%	 -1.28%	 -4.71%	 -3.53%	
Adjusted	t-statistic	 -1.54	 -0.32	 -0.94	 -0.58	
	 	 	 	 	Panel	B	
	 	 	 			 6	months	 12	months	 18	months	 24	months	
BHARs	 -3.34%	 -1.50%	 -7.93%	 -5.90%	




















	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Year	 -1	 0	 1	 2	 		 Period	 (-1,0)	 (0,+1)	 (-1,+1)	 (-1,+2)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Mean	 1.56	 3.29	 2.81	 2.65	
	
Mean	change	 1.73	 -0.47	 1.25	 1.09	
Median	 3.56	 4.15	 4.18	 2.75	
	
p	value	 0.261	 0.748	 0.411	 0.452	
Observations	 103	 103	 103	 103	
	
Wilcoxon	p	value	 0.228	 0.652	 0.520	 0.442	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Panel	B	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Year	 -1	 0	 1	 2	 		 Period	 (-1,0)	 (0,+1)	 (-1,+1)	 (-1,+2)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Mean	 1.71	 2.46	 2.21	 1.47	
	
Mean	change	 0.76	 -0.26	 0.50	 -0.24	
Median	 3.56	 4.15	 4.18	 2.48	
	
p	value	 0.697	 0.900	 0.792	 0.892	
Observations	 71	 71	 71	 71	
	






	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Year	 -1	 0	 1	 2	 		 Period	 (-1,0)	 (0,+1)	 (-1,+1)	 (-1,+2)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Mean	 3.17	 8.61	 5.69	 5.58	
	
Mean	change	 5.44	 -2.91	 2.52	 2.41	
Median	 8.39	 10.08	 12.54	 8.51	
	
p	value	 0.172	 0.462	 0.573	 0.595	
Observations	 102	 101	 102	 98	
	
Wilcoxon	p	value	 0.162	 0.868	 0.131	 0.355	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Panel	B	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Year	 -1	 0	 1	 2	 		 Period	 (-1,0)	 (0,+1)	 (-1,+1)	 (-1,+2)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Mean	 2.74	 5.08	 3.78	 3.53	
	
Mean	change	 2.34	 -1.30	 1.04	 0.79	
Median	 7.47	 9.83	 9.09	 4.15	
	
p	value	 0.591	 0.768	 0.826	 0.850	
Observations	 70	 69	 70	 68	
	







Test	 results	 of	 the	 sellers’	 efficiency	 depict	 insignificant	 mean	 and	 median	
changes	of	the	sales	to	total	assets	ratio	for	both	samples	and	for	all	the	periods	under	
investigation.	The	lower	figures	in	year	0	in	contrast	to	the	respective	figures	in	year	-1	








	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Year	 -1	 0	 1	 2	 		 Period	 (-1,0)	 (0,+1)	 (-1,+1)	 (-1,+2)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Mean	 0.87	 0.83	 0.86	 0.85	
	
Mean	change	 -0.04	 0.03	 -0.01	 -0.02	
Median	 0.80	 0.79	 0.76	 0.75	
	
p	value	 0.546	 0.629	 0.905	 0.817	
Observations	 103	 103	 103	 103	
	
Wilcoxon	p	value	 0.437	 0.125	 0.702	 0.415	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Panel	B	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Year	 -1	 0	 1	 2	 		 Period	 (-1,0)	 (0,+1)	 (-1,+1)	 (-1,+2)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Mean	 0.89	 0.85	 0.87	 0.86	
	
Mean	change	 -0.04	 0.02	 -0.02	 -0.03	
Median	 0.82	 0.84	 0.78	 0.75	
	
p	value	 0.612	 0.794	 0.809	 0.698	
Observations	 71	 71	 71	 71	
	






Mean	 and	 median	 changes	 of	 the	 selling	 firms’	 liquidity	 levels,	 which	 are	
measured	by	the	cash	to	total	assets	ratio,	turn	out	positive	but	overall	insignificant.	The	
higher	ratio	on	the	announcement	year	than	on	the	year	before,	 is	attributable	to	the	
simultaneous	 increase	 in	 cash	and	decrease	of	assets,	 as	a	 result	of	 the	 sell-off.	 From	






	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Year	 -1	 0	 1	 2	 		 Period	 (-1,0)	 (0,+1)	 (-1,+1)	 (-1,+2)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Mean	 15.13	 16.71	 17.15	 16.95	
	
Mean	change	 1.59	 0.43	 2.02	 1.82	
Median	 14.50	 14.21	 13.50	 14.66	
	
p	value	 0.315	 0.808	 0.205	 0.253	
Observations	 103	 103	 103	 103	
	
Wilcoxon	p	value	 0.281	 0.786	 0.04*	 0.376	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Panel	B	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Year	 -1	 0	 1	 2	 		 Period	 (-1,0)	 (0,+1)	 (-1,+1)	 (-1,+2)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Mean	 15.67	 17.40	 18.16	 17.81	
	
Mean	change	 1.72	 0.77	 2.49	 2.14	
Median	 15.21	 14.41	 13.50	 15.08	
	
p	value	 0.366	 0.731	 0.206	 0.264	
Observations	 71	 71	 71	 71	
	









positive,	 but	 not	 statistically	 significant	 for	 any	 sample.	 The	 small	 difference	 in	 the	
period	 (-1,	 0)	 for	 the	 full	 sample	 and	 the	 respective	 negative	 difference	 for	 the	 sub-
sample,	show	that	despite	the	fact	that	firms	have	a	lower	amount	of	assets	in	year	zero	







	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Year	 -1	 0	 1	 2	 		 Period	 (-1,0)	 (0,+1)	 (-1,+1)	 (-1,+2)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Mean	 16.70	16.92	 18.69	 21.26	
	
Mean	change	 0.22	 1.78	 2.00	 4.57	
Median	 17.73	15.62	 18.97	 22.16	
	
p	value	 0.919	 0.441	 0.369	 0.043*	
Observations	 103	 103	 103	 103	
	
Wilcoxon	p	value	 0.332	 0.030*	 0.202	 0.002***	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Panel	B	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Year	 -1	 0	 1	 2	 		 Period	 (-1,0)	 (0,+1)	 (-1,+1)	 (-1,+2)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Mean	 14.84	14.35	 16.19	 18.99	
	
Mean	change	 -0.49	 1.85	 1.36	 4.15	
Median	 13.00	 8.85	 14.94	 18.93	
	
p	value	 0.847	 0.486	 0.609	 0.112	
Observations	 71	 71	 71	 71	
	







This	 study	examines	 the	short-	and	 long-run	return	performance	of	corporate	sell-offs	
announcements	 using	 a	 sample	 with	 contaminated	 announcements	 and	 a	 sample	
without	overlapping	events	10	days	prior	and	10	days	after	the	announcement	day.	The	





In	 terms	 of	 short-run	 shareholder	 wealth,	 the	 results	 provide	 evidence,	
consistent	with	prior	 findings,	 that	 sell-off	announcements	are	generating	significantly	
positive	abnormal	returns	for	the	shareholders	of	the	selling	firms.	Abnormal	returns	of	
2.04%	 for	 the	 full	 sample	 and	 2.75%	 for	 the	 sub-sample	 are	 observed	 on	 the	 initial	
announcement	day,	concluding	that	sell-offs	generate	gains	on	their	announcement.		
With	 respect	 to	 long-run	 shareholder	 wealth,	 although	 negative	 abnormal	
returns	for	up	to	two	years	following	the	initial	announcement	are	observed	for	6,	12,	
18	and	24	months	after	the	initial	announcement,		their	increase	from	-3.12%	to	-1.28%	
for	 the	 full-sample	 and	 from	 -3.34%	 to	 -1.50%	 for	 the	 sub-sample	 between	 6	 and	 12	
months	 after	 the	 announcement	propose	 that	 shareholders	 are	 rewarded	 if	 the	 firms	
use	the	proceeds	from	the	sell-off	efficiently.	
Regarding	 the	 post	 performance	 of	 the	 selling	 firms,	 despite	 the	 insignificant	
mean	 and	 median	 changes	 in	 the	 firms’	 operating	 performance	 reported	 for	 several	
periods	around	 the	announcement	year,	 the	 results	of	 the	analysis	 show	that	 sell-offs	
are	positively	associated	with	the	improvement	in	the	firms’	post	profitability,	 liquidity	
and	leverage	levels	and	contribute	to	the	maintenance	of	their	efficiency	levels.	
In	 conclusion,	 this	 study	 shows	 that	 sell-offs	 are	 generally	 value-enhancing	
decisions	for	shareholders.	Shareholders	enjoy	significant	positive	wealth	gains	around	
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